Profit-sharing regulation: an economic appraisal by Colin Mayer & John Vickers
Fiscal Studies (1996) vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 1-18
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1999
Profit-Sharing Regulation: An
Economic Appraisal
COLIN MAYER and JOHN VICKERS
1
I. INTRODUCTION
The stock market, take-over bidders, executive pay setters, perhaps Stephen
Littlechild himself, even last summer’s weather, all seem to have been
undermining RPI–X price-cap regulation. Until recently, price-cap regulation
was regarded as demonstrably superior to US-style rate-of-return regulation, and
regulatory reform in several countries has embraced price-cap regulation.
2 But in
Britain, where price- cap regulation originated, the case now appears to be less
compelling: price-cap regulation is perceived by some as conferring unwarranted
profits on the utilities and imposing unsustainable demands on regulators. As a
consequence, many people believe that we are slipping inexorably into some
form of profit regulation.
It is time for reform, say the critics, and the leading candidate to displace
RPI–X is `sliding-scale’ regulation, which would share profit gains (and losses)
between the regulated firm and its consumers. New Labour has embraced profit-
sharing regulation, and some of the regulators, notably the Director General of
Gas Supply, are interested in it too. In addition, there is a body of academic
literature that supports sliding-scale regulation, including the recent papers by
Burns, Turvey and Weyman-Jones (1995a and 1995b).
3 Proponents of sliding-
scale regulation point to four kinds of advantage: allocative efficiency,
distributional fairness, risk sharing, and sustainability of regulation.
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In this paper, we address two questions:
(a) Is profit-sharing regulation indeed superior to price-cap
regulation?
(b) Are the problems of price-cap regulation as it now
operates in Britain best solved by a move to profit-sharing regulation?
While not denying the force of the arguments mentioned above, we conclude that
the answer to (a) is far from clear. Furthermore, we contend that the advantages
claimed for profit-sharing regulation can be better achieved by modifying rather
than abandoning price-cap regulation. We therefore answer (b) in the negative
and suggest that profit-sharing regulation fails to address some of the most
serious defects of price-cap regulation as it has been practised in Britain.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews some economic
theory of regulation, emphasising issues of information, incentives and
dynamics. Section III assesses the problem of measuring profit for regulatory
purposes. Section IV puts forward alternative approaches. The concluding
section summarises our answers to the two questions above.
II. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATION
For simplicity, we shall focus on regulation of a single-product monopolist that
aims to maximise profit (or its net present value (NPV) in a dynamic setting).
Generalisation to the multi-product case would add important issues to the
analysis, but for the most part they do not concern the main points at issue. The
working assumption of profit maximisation abstracts from some managerial
incentive questions, but these will be taken up in subsequent discussion.
Also for simplicity, we shall take it that regulatory schemes are to be
evaluated by the welfare criterion of the (possibly weighted) sum of consumer
surplus and profit. Three commonly distinguished components of welfare are:
•   allocative efficiency, which calls for cost-reflective pricing;
•   productive efficiency, which requires supply at minimum industry cost; and
•   distributional considerations, which involve curbing excess profit.
Regulatory schemes are viewed as incomplete contracts, the terms of which are
revised over time, and which might leave considerable scope for the exercise of
discretion by both the firm and its regulator. The regulatory arrangements give
the firm incentives that are partly explicit (e.g. incentives resulting from the
price- control formula) and partly implicit (e.g. incentives to influence regulatory
reviews and the exercise of regulatory discretion).Profit-Sharing Regulation
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1. Neo-Classical Analysis
Neo-classical theory describes the firm by its production function, which
specifies the level of output Q = F(L,K) as a function of labour and capital inputs
used. Letting p,  w and r denote the prices of output, labour and capital
respectively, we have that profit is equal to π  = pQ - wL - rK.
The best-known result in the neo-classical theory of regulation is the Averch–
Johnson effect which arises under rate-of-return regulation that allows the firm
to earn a rate of return s > r on its capital. The firm, maximising π  subject to the
constraint that pQ - wL ! sK, will produce its output with an inefficiently high
K/L ratio. Thus the regime gives the firm an incentive to overemploy capital in
order to earn the margin s–r on more K, and productive inefficiency is the result.
In sum, the firm distorts its input choice to manipulate regulation in its favour.
Burns, Turvey and Weyman-Jones (1995a and 1995b) also take a neo-
classical approach. One of the forms of profit-sharing regulation that they
examine requires the monopolist to rebate to consumers a fraction τ (p) of its
profit, where τ ’(p) > 0 , so that the profit rebate is larger, the higher the price
charged. Then the firm’s objective is to maximise π (1 - τ (p)). Provided that τ <1,
productive efficiency is best for the firm (unlike in the Averch–Johnson model).
So this form of profit- sharing regulation involves no compromise of productive
efficiency, and its built-in flexibility would seem to have advantages over fixed
price-cap regulation in terms of allocative and distributional efficiency, and
hence general credibility and robustness.
2. Asymmetric Information
4
The economics of regulation has been developed in recent years to take explicit
account of two key issues:
5
(a) incentives in a world of uncertainty and asymmetric information; and
(b) difficulties of making credible commitments over time.
The practical importance of these issues is very well illustrated by the regulatory
crisis following the bid by Trafalgar House for Northern Electric. Bringing them
into the analysis permits exploration of trade-offs between different regulatory
schemes. With the neo-classical approach, on the other hand, it is often the case
that many schemes can implement the ideal solution, and the theory of optimal
regulation lacks bite.
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First, consider static models with asymmetric information. Suppose that,
unlike the neo-classical firm which always operates on its production frontier,
the firm can reduce its costs (or add to its value for money) by making
unobservable but costly efforts. To capture the idea that costs are affected by the
firm’s effort e, let the observable unit cost level c = θ  - e, where θ  is a parameter
unknown to the regulator. So the regulator cannot observe, for example, whether
low cost is due to good luck or hard work. Let the cost of effort, which is borne
by the firm (or its managers), be a convex function ψ (e) >. The firm’s incentives
to make effort depend on how its regulated price p varies with c. Suppose that
this variation is linear, and let α  = dp/dc. Thus α  measures cost pass-through, or,
equivalently in this framework, the extent of profit sharing. In the simplest
example with inelastic unit demand, the firm will choose the effort level e that
satisfies ψ ’(e) = 1 - α . Pure price- cap regulation has α  = 0, and pure cost-plus
regulation has α  = 1. The former has perfect effort incentives but no sensitivity
to allocative efficiency, whereas the latter has the opposite qualities.
What is the optimal level of α ? To answer this question fully, it would be
necessary to specify the regulatory tools and information conditions in more
detail — for example, whether the regulator can use lump-sum transfers, and
whether the firm knows θ  when it chooses e. But in a wide range of
circumstances, optimal α  will lie between zero and one. Starting from pure price
cap (α  = 0), some relaxation of incentives is desirable because the loss of
productive efficiency is second-order whereas the gain in allocative efficiency
(or distributional efficiency, or risk sharing
6 in a richer model) is first-order. In a
static setting, then, incentive theories of regulation suggest that some profit
sharing is a good idea.
3. Credibility and Commitment
But now we come to issue (b): difficulties of making credible commitments over
time. The regulator, even if he or she wanted to, could not credibly commit not
to adjust price in the light of unfolding events. From time to time — at
prescribed intervals and sometimes in between — prices get reviewed. As a
result, there is a kind of ratchet effect — after a while, cost reduction by the firm
will be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. This blunts the
firm’s cost-reduction incentives. Even if the current explicit price-control
formula says that α  = 0, the effective level of α  could be significantly greater
than zero taking account of the implicit incentives deriving from the prospect of
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regulatory review. Indeed, it has been estimated that well over half of the net
present value of unanticipated cost saving is enjoyed by consumers.
7
In short, price-cap regulation with periodic reviews itself involves profit
sharing, albeit with a lag.
8 What matters for incentives is the combination of cost
pass- through in the price-control formula (explicit profit sharing) and the lag
between price reviews (implicit profit sharing). To keep incentives the same,
more cost pass- through would have to be accompanied by longer regulatory lag.
It could, of course, be argued that a weakening of incentives should be tolerated
in order to promote credibility and perceived fairness, though this point does not
seem to be part of the case made by proponents of profit sharing. The analysis
that follows suggests that shortening regulatory lag would be a better way of
doing this than profit sharing.
9
Of course, regulatory lag cannot simply be fixed exogenously, because there
is the issue of interim intervention. Unless credibility not to intervene is total, the
effective lag, so to speak, will be shorter than the explicit lag. Might profit-
sharing regulation help incentives by increasing the credibility of non-
intervention? Suppose that 50:50 sharing of current excess (or deficient) profit
were introduced and that lag were doubled from five to 10 years. Ignoring
discounting, this would leave the value of incentives unchanged. How does
credibility compare between the two cases?
A simple example suggests that the answer to this question is ambiguous.
Suppose that θ , the exogenous component of cost, evolves randomly
according to the stochastic process θ t - θ t-1  =  zt, where zt is an independent
random variable with mean zero and variance σ
2. Assume away problems of
measuring profit (see Section III), and assume that price was set so as to yield a
normal return at the start of the regulatory period. It is appropriate to compare
the credibility of the price-cap regime after n periods with that of the 50:50
profit-sharing regime after 2n periods.
Suppose first that the credibility of the regulatory system (e.g. the probability
that there will be no interim intervention) is inversely related to the variance of
current profit.
10 In the price-cap regime, the current profit variance after n
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2. Likewise, there is an obligation on regulators to ensure that firms have adequate revenues to finance
their Likewise, there is an obligation on regulators to ensure that firms have adequate revenues to finance their




2. In the profit-sharing regime, the current profit variance after 2n
periods is nσ
2/2. In this case, the profit-sharing regime is more credible than the
price-cap regime, because profit sharing reduces current profit variance more
than proportionately.
But now suppose that credibility depends on the variance of accumulated
excess (or deficient) profit. (Share values might be expected to reflect this stock
measure more than the current profit flow.) In the price-cap regime, the
accumulated profit variance after n periods is [n
2 + (n-1)
2 + ... + 1]σ
2. In the
profit-sharing regime, the accumulated profit variance after 2n periods is [(2n)
2 +
(2n-1)
2 + ... + 1]σ
2 / 4. The profit-sharing regime is less credible than the price-
cap regime, because the effect of cost shocks on accumulated profit, though
somewhat dampened by profit sharing, is magnified through accumulation.
Examples of this kind could easily be enriched, for example by modifying the
stochastic cost process or by introducing discounting. But the two cases
presented suffice to make our main point, which is that it is by no means obvious
that profit sharing is superior on credibility grounds. Profit sharing must be
accompanied by longer intervals between regulatory reviews to avoid incentives
being weakened. Profit sharing helps credibility for a given lag but may worsen
credibility when incentives are preserved by lengthening the lag. Furthermore,
profit sharing might have disadvantages on credibility grounds if it involved
continuous, rather than periodic, regulatory discretion over the measurement of
profit.
4. Some Evidence from Local Telecommunications Operators in the US
The discussion so far has been in terms of economic principles. Empirical
evidence on the relative merits of price-cap and profit-sharing schemes is hard to
obtain because the importance of industry- and country-specific factors makes
cross- industry and international comparisons hazardous, and intra-industry
regulatory practice within countries tends to be uniform (not only if there is
nation-wide monopoly). A notable exception, however, is the case of local
telephone exchange companies (LECs) in the US, which have been studied by
Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller (1995). Following the break-up of AT&T,
state regulators adopted a variety of approaches to price controls — including
price caps, profit sharing (known as earnings sharing) and hybrid systems —
thereby providing some kind of ‘natural experiment’.
Greenstein et al. examine the rate of investment in modern infrastructure (e.g.
fibre-optic technology) by all large LECs, and seek to isolate the effect of
regulatory policies by controlling for economic and demographic factors. They
conclude (p. 187) that
First, price regulation (and, in particular, price caps) is a more potent regulatory mechanism
than the standard earnings sharing scheme. Second, when associated with an earningsProfit-Sharing Regulation
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sharing scheme, price regulation is less effective in triggering infrastructure deployment
than when it is implemented by itself.
Investment in new technology is, of course, but one aspect of industry
performance, though it is one that might be rather influenced by regulatory
credibility. Institutional and other differences between the US and Britain mean
that the same findings might not apply here. Nevertheless, this evidence in
favour of price-cap regulation from LECs in the US, which offer a rare
opportunity for comparison between the effects of different regulatory methods,
gives at least some empirical support for the earlier theoretical analysis.
III. MEASURING PROFITS
In this section, we consider whether profit can be measured well enough to be
incorporated explicitly into price controls. For firms with few capital assets, e.g.
trading firms, where current operating costs form the bulk of costs, the answer is
positive and implementation of the analysis of the previous section is relatively
straightforward. But capital assets, typically inherited from before privatisation,
are hugely important in the utility industries. The costs attributed to those assets
are a large component of overall cost and a major determinant of ‘profit’.
Profits are traditionally measured in historic cost terms. Current cost
accounting has, however, been employed in a number of UK utilities,
particularly water and electricity. Current cost accounting has advantages in
relation to the information it provides about the existence of economic rents and
profitable investment and disinvestment opportunities. In contrast, historic cost
accounting provides little reliable information relevant for the economic
regulation of firms.
There are, however, formidable problems involved in the determination of
profits (on a current cost basis). Asset valuations should be based on the
principle of modern equivalent assets (MEA) — the lowest-cost investments
required to provide the same level of services that existing assets offer.
11 For
example, a gas pipeline or electricity distribution network may have been created
in a piecemeal fashion over a long period of time as system needs evolved. A
new system would probably comprise a quite different configuration from that
inherited from the past. The MEA approach values the hypothetical new system
on the grounds that it is the lowest-cost way of providing the services, and if the
owners of the current assets are rewarded on a higher valuation, then it will be
efficient for a new system to replace the old. Likewise, electricity generating
companies’ assets should be valued on the basis of the hypothetical lowest-cost
configuration of generators, which might differ considerably from the actual
                                                                                                                                   




mix, for example if relative fuel prices have altered since existing power-stations
were built.
It will be apparent that asset valuation on the MEA approach necessarily
involves a large element of subjectivity, if only because the optimal system to
build today depends on projected cost and demand movements. Correspondingly,
there is substantial scope and incentive for manipulation. Most unregulated
companies, and their managers, have incentives to make profitability appear
high.
12 This encourages undervaluations of assets to raise reported rates of
return, to reduce depreciation entries in profit-and-loss statements, and to allow
subsequent upward revaluations. For regulated firms, however, incentives for
manipulation are less clear. In so far as there is profit clawback — explicitly by
profit-sharing regulation and/or implicitly at periodic reviews — companies have
incentives to depress reported profits and rates of return by overstating asset
values.
Profit rate measurement is still more problematic in the utilities because of
events before and at the time of privatisation. While, in principle, current cost is
the appropriate basis for evaluation, in practice the asset values of many utilities
are far removed from this. The water companies, whose market valuations are
about one-tenth of their current cost valuations, provide a particularly stark
example. Before privatisation, the charges levied on customers by many utilities
fell well short of those needed to earn a return equal to the cost of capital on the
current cost value of assets. Basically, consumers in many sectors were being
substantially subsidised by nationalised industries. At the time of privatisation, it
was politically impossible to raise prices to levels corresponding to current cost
valuations. So the regulatory system for many regulated utilities inherited a
pattern of subsidy from the previous regime, and their asset valuations stand well
below current cost.
The asset valuations used for regulatory purposes evolve as follows. New
investments made since privatisation (or the last regulatory review) are added to
the valuations used then (with due allowances being made for depreciation). At a
price review, the regulator allows the firm to capitalise some of the efficiency
gains made since privatisation (or the last review) and passes through to
consumers any residual profits in the form of lower charges. Thus there is a
serious endogeneity in the determination of profits: the return that a firm earns
over a regulatory period depends on the proportion of cost reductions that the
firm is allowed to retain, which in turn depends on the incentives that the
regulator believes to be appropriate.
To see this point in more detail, consider a company formed at the start of
period 1 which lasts until the end of period 2. Let Vt be the value of its capital
stock at the start of period t. Let be the firm’s expected revenue in period t
                                                                                                                                   







where expectations are formed at the start of period s, and define expected cost
likewise. For simplicity, assume no discounting. Then, by definition,
and
Period 1 profit is
where R1 and  C1 are out-turn revenues and costs in period 1. Thus profit in
period 1 is a combination of (a) the extent to which current earnings exceeded
expectations and (b) the extent to which expectations of period 2 earnings have
been revised from what they were at the start of period 1.
The latter depends on how the regulator is expected to react to earnings
reported in period 1. Suppose, for example, that a proportion β  of the cost shock
is expected to persist in period 2, and that the firm is allowed to pass
through α  of this shock. Then period 1 profit is
Profit therefore depends on (a) how expectations of future earnings are revised
and (b) how the regulator is expected to react to new information in allowing
cost pass- through.
More generally, it is clear from this example that profit is a forward-looking
concept. Investors can earn profits without any excess operating earnings being
observed in the current period if expectations of future earnings have been
revised upwards. This seems to characterise quite well the supposed deficiencies
of regulation that have been revealed by take-over bids for regional electricity
companies such as that by Trafalgar House for Northern Electric. The current
earnings of Northern Electric have altered relatively little, while its share price
has risen sharply, chiefly because the Trafalgar House bid revealed the potential
for future earnings gains (if only from tax savings). Note that a profit-sharing
arrangement based on Northern Electric’s current earnings would have done
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little to ameliorate the revealed shortcomings of OFFER’s initial distribution
review, and so would not have contributed much to regulatory stability.
Share prices reveal anticipated future monopoly rents from lax regulation
which are only reflected in earnings after an extended period of time. Instead of
basing profit sharing on past accounting earnings, stock market returns may be a
more relevant measure of performance. A take-over bid that discloses large
potential cost savings is reflected in market values but not in past operating
earnings. Lax regulation is revealed by high market capitalisation relative to the
amount of invested equity capital. Thus the ratio of market value to regulatory
book value can be used as a measure of the stance of regulation at each
regulatory review. However, market values in turn reflect expectations of future
regulatory behaviour, and, as the example above illustrated, there is an inherent
circularity in trying to base regulation on market values — for example, the
market value at the start of period 2, V2, depends on the prices set by the
regulator.
In summary, profit measures are subjective, open to manipulation and prone
to an inherent problem of circularity. Strict price-cap regulation avoids these
problems by removing any relation between performance and prices. However,
as noted above, it does this at the expense of introducing potentially diverging
relations between prices and costs. The compromise that has been found has
been to undertake occasional reassessments of prices at periodic reviews and, in
principle, to leave price limits unchanged between reviews. The attraction of this
in comparison with profit-sharing rules is that it restricts profit measurement
exercises to particular occasions when the necessary detailed public consultation
and analysis (and possibly reference to the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission) can be undertaken. By contrast, the inclusion of explicit ‘profit’
terms in price controls might create continuous costly argument and indeed an
increase, rather than a reduction, in regulatory uncertainty.
The problems of measuring profit prompt a search for alternative ways of
seeking to keep prices in line with costs between reviews. This is the subject of
the next section.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
So far, we have considered how the price that a firm is permitted to charge
should be related to its costs (this being equivalent to linking price to profit in
the simple examples under discussion). A principle of incentive theory is that all
relevant information should be exploited when setting incentive contracts. The
firm’s own cost (or profit) is unlikely to be the only relevant information for
price setting, in which case there is scope for improving the trade-off between
incentives for productive efficiency and the aims of allocative and distributional
efficiency.Profit-Sharing Regulation
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1. Yardstick Measures of Profit
Some but not all of the problems discussed in Section III can be ameliorated by
using ‘yardstick’ measures of profit.
13 Some UK utilities were privatised as
regional rather than national monopolies, notably the water and electricity
distribution industries in England and Wales. In these cases, there is the
possibility of using industry-wide performance information as well as individual
company data.
If, as in an earlier example, earnings vary from expectation for two reasons
— good/bad luck and high/low effort — and if luck affects all firms in the
industry in similar ways, then the variation of a firm’s performance from the
industry average or yardstick is informative about the performance of the
individual firm. A system that aims to give consumers the benefit of good
fortune should then be based on the industry yardstick and not (just) on the
performance of the individual firm.
It is well known that in the polar case where luck is perfectly correlated
across firms, it is possible to combine allocative efficiency with perfect
incentives for cost efficiency by relating the price that firm i can charge to the
average cost performance of all other firms in the industry. In profit-sharing
terms, the rebate to i’s consumers depends on the profit performance, relative to
what was expected, of firms in other regions rather than on the firm’s own profit
performance.
Such a system has a number of attractive properties. First, there is no dilution
of i’s incentives to cut costs: the firm’s own profits do not affect the customer
rebate. All the incentive properties of pure price-cap regulation are therefore
retained. Second, there is no incentive for firms to manipulate their reported
profits. Third, if the market valuations of other firms, rather than their current
earnings, are used as the basis for price setting at times of regulatory review,
then the point that profit should be a forward-looking concept can also be met.
The circularity problems inherent in using own market valuations are avoided.
What yardstick measures of profit cannot overcome are (a) the subjective
nature of profits measures discussed above, (b) the imperfect nature of inter-firm
comparisons (luck is not perfectly correlated across firms) and (c) the fact that
market valuations may reflect more than the regulated activities of the firms in
question.
2. Other Yardstick Measures
There are three main reasons why performance may deviate from expectations:
demand, operating costs or capital costs may differ from predictions. The most
straightforward measure of performance that incorporates all three factors is net
cash flow defined as revenue minus operating costs minus capital expenditures
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and taxes paid. It can be extended to include net receipts of interest and net debt
issued. If it is, then by the sources and uses of funds identity, cash flow is equal
to dividends paid to shareholders less new equity raised from shareholders, i.e.
net distributions of cash to shareholders. This is an extension of the proposal that
dividends should be used as the basis of a tax, i.e. that dividend increases should
only occur when customers derive some benefits in the form of lower prices.
Note the importance of including net new issues of equity. Not only does this put
share repurchases on the same basis as dividends but it also brings acquisitions
of shares into the tax base and thereby ensures that customers automatically
share in the benefits of take-overs. Increasing the effective tax rate on dividends
paid by regulated utilities might also have the advantage of encouraging
investment, which might be expected to be suboptimal if regulatory risk is
significant.
Cash flow avoids the subjective nature of asset valuations involved in the
determination of depreciation and is much less readily open to manipulation than
profits in so far as it excludes provisions. Again, if comparative information is
available, then price adjustments are best made on the basis of deviations of cash
flows from expectations of other firms in an industry. However, it is important to
appreciate that cash flow is not a profits measure in so far as it excludes returns
that accrue in the form of capital gains: shareholders can earn high rates of return
in the form of capital gains in the absence of dividend distributions. It is
therefore not a substitute for asset valuations and profit projections but it serves
to emphasise that the complex assessment of expected future earnings is the
proper subject of periodic reviews.
The value of comparative information depends on the degree of correlation
between the luck/misfortune element of the performance of firms. This may well
vary across the different components of net cash flow. For example, the
determinants of revenues in water utilities depend on the industrial/domestic
composition of their customer base. Unless industrial and domestic demand are
closely correlated, net cash flows may display little correlation even where there
is a high degree of correlation of firms’ costs. Where this applies, adjustment to
prices may be more appropriately conditioned on comparative information on
deviation of costs rather than cash flows from expectations.
A simple example illustrates. There has been much concern that regulators in
the UK made too generous provision for costs, both operating and capital costs,
in the last round of periodic reviews. Indeed, the subsequent adjustment that
Littlechild made in electricity suggests that potential cost savings were
underestimated the first time round. A system of adjusting prices on the basis of
deviations of actual costs from expectations would, over time, have picked up
this error. However, basing the adjustment on own costs seriously diminishes
incentives to pursue efficiency savings. Instead, if deviations of actual from
predicted costs of other firms in the industry are used, then common costProfit-Sharing Regulation
13
influences can be incorporated in prices at the same time as incentives are
retained.
3. Conditioning Price on Exogenous Cost and Demand Information
The potential for performing yardstick comparisons does not exist in all
industries. Some utilities were privatised as monopolies, e.g. British Gas and
BAA (formerly the British Airports Authority). Some have competitors but only
very limited comparators, e.g. British Telecom. In these industries, the use of
sharing arrangements based on either profits or other bench-marks raises
incentive problems. In this section, we suggest that instead of pursuing the idea
of profit sharing, attention is better devoted to trying to establish exogenous
determinants of performance that do not adversely affect incentives.
We consider two examples in British Gas and BAA, for both of which the
single most important exogenous influence on performance is demand.
Temperature variations are a major influence on revenues in gas. In airports, the
main reason for high rates of return has been growth in passenger revenue in
general and income from retail outlets in particular. Some growth in demand can
be attributed to the success of the firm in promoting the use of airports and retail
outlets. But a large element of the growth in passenger revenues simply reflects
increased air traffic and the importance of London as a hub in Europe. In both
cases, there is therefore a good case for adjusting prices to reflect demand
fluctuations.
14 There is a well- established relation between temperature and
demand in gas, and evaluating the influence of passenger numbers on airport
income is quite straightforward.
In addition to demand, there are a number of components of costs that are
outside the control of firms. The two most important are wage costs and capital
goods prices. While some reduction in costs is attributable to efficiency savings
of firms in, for example, reducing manpower, some is attributable to changing
unit costs through, for example, falling construction price indices, which have
nothing to do with efficient management. Likewise, there are sectoral and
regional labour cost indices that could be used to distinguish unanticipated cost
savings due to efficiency from exogenous unit labour cost changes. In other
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point where the credibility of regulation is at stake. In any event, the additional complications caused by a
volume adjustment do not appear large.Fiscal Studies
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words, the retail price index alone might not be the best cost/price index for
regulatory purposes. At the time of privatisation, the RPI may have had the
political attraction that consumers were protected in terms of real price
movements, but profit movement seems now to be a major public concern.
Essentially, this proposal to employ more exogenous cost and demand
information is equivalent to, at least partial, demand and cost pass-through.
Price- cap formulas are adjusted to incorporate the exogenous components of
performance. We would suggest that where yardstick measures are poor,
attention is better devoted to improving the demand and cost pass-through
components of pricing formulas than introducing profit-sharing arrangements.
4. Diversified Firms
The creation of diversified conglomerates out of single-sector utilities poses
serious problems for performance measurement. Initially, diversification took the
form of utilities investing in or purchasing companies in sectors outside their
core activities. For the most part, the scale of these investments was small in
comparison with the value of assets employed in their core businesses. However,
recently there have been a number of proposed acquisitions of utilities by
companies in other or related industrial or geographical sectors. The bid by
Trafalgar House for Northern Electric was the first example of a proposed
acquisition of an electricity company by a firm outside the sector; Hanson’s bid
for Eastern Electricity is a similar case; Southern Company’s bid for South
Western Electricity is an example of an overseas acquisition of an electricity
distribution firm; and the bid for Manweb by Scottish Power is an acquisition of
an electricity distribution company by a vertically integrated supplier. If these
bids succeed, then a majority of the combined group’s activities will be situated
outside the industrial or geographical sector of the acquired utility. The bids by
PowerGen and by National Power for regional electricity companies, which
involve vertical integration in the same geographic market, are, of course,
another matter.
The response to this problem has been to require companies to report separate
accounts for their core and other businesses through, for example, holding the
assets of the utility in a subsidiary account. In practice, the implementation of
separation raises serious difficulties. Transfer pricing allows companies to shift
resources to and from the subsidiary and to subsidise the activities of core or
non-core activities. Regulators attempt to avoid this by requiring companies to
market test transactions with the utility and to establish market prices at which
transactions should take place. However, this imposes formidable information
requirements on regulators.
These problems become significantly more serious when utilities are acquired
by other firms. First, the concept of a separate business unit loses economic
meaning. Consider, for example, the cost of capital of the utility. While it can beProfit-Sharing Regulation
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argued that the cost of equity capital should relate to the systematic risk of the
core business rather than the group, the same cannot be said of debt finance: the
cost at which the utility can raise debt finance will be largely determined by the
group rather than the utility, even if in principle there are legal limitations on the
liability of the group to the utility. The same applies to trade creditors, and the
cost at which the utility will be able to purchase goods and services will reflect
the perceived riskiness of the group rather than the core. More generally, there
will be economies of scale in the cost of goods and services purchased and sold
which will make the separate identification of prices for the core almost
meaningless.
Second, on completion of the acquisition, the utility will be delisted from the
stock market and no separate share price will be observable. This makes it
impossible to determine performance from returns to shareholders, to identify
the systematic risk of the utility separately from the business as a whole, and to
compare the book or regulatory value of assets employed with their market
value. Third, as the regulator of the water industry in particular has noted,
acquisitions reduce the number of companies that can be included in
comparative efficiency exercises. Acquisition therefore entails a significant loss
of information for the regulator — though, as events in the electricity sector have
illustrated, take-over bids may reveal important information.
The loss of information to the regulator caused by acquisitions could be
significantly reduced by requiring bidders to satisfy one condition: the listing of
a certain proportion of shares in the utility subsidiary on the stock market.
15 It is
commonplace for continental European companies to list a minority of shares
(e.g. 20 per cent or 30 per cent) of a subsidiary on a stock market. This is
regarded as being valuable in (a) providing information to parent companies
about the performance of the subsidiary and (b) allowing external equity to be
raised by the subsidiary. The market in subsidiary shares is often quite liquid,
and abuses of minorities are avoided through requiring dividend distributions to
parent companies and other shareholders to satisfy certain (e.g. equal payment)
rules.
In the case of utilities, a stock market listing allows the regulator to monitor
the share price performance of the core utility. Equity costs of capital could be
determined from the systematic risk of the subsidiary’s shares, and accounting
and regulatory book values could be compared with market values. Furthermore,
by establishing a group of investors who are concerned about the performance of
the subsidiary as distinct from its parent, the regulator would have valuable
support in his or her efforts to police transfers of resources out of the utility. For
                                                                                                                                   
15 This idea was discussed, but not adopted, by Stephen Littlechild, the electricity regulator, following the bid
by Trafalgar House for Northern Electric. Ian Byatt, the water regulator, has supported the proposal (see, for
example, his letter to the Financial Times of 29 December 1995). He has secured agreement from Lyonnaise
des Eaux that it will list its British water interests on the stock exchange by 2005.Fiscal Studies
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example, minority shareholders have incentives to ensure that they receive their
fair share of net cash distributions from subsidiaries (dividends paid less new
equity capital received from parents), which Section IV(2) proposed as a less
subjective measure of performance than profits.
16 While performance
measurement problems will unquestionably remain, the regulator can enhance
his or her information about both utility performance and the extent of parent
company abuse by requiring utilities to have separate stock market listings.
In sum, diversification undermines performance measurement and the
practicality of profit sharing. If minority shareholding requirements can be
imposed, then market value information can be used and, in industries with more
than one utility, it may be possible to employ comparative market value data.
However, in general, the difficulties raised by diversification point further in the
direction of conditioning consumer prices on exogenous cost and demand
information.
V. CONCLUSION
Our main conclusion is that, although price-cap regulation as it has been
practised in the UK has serious weaknesses, it is by no means clear that profit-
sharing regulation would be superior. There are good reasons for seeking reform
of current price regulation: allocative efficiency, distributional fairness and the
credibility of regulation can all be enhanced through changes to existing
regulatory rules. However, it is doubtful that profit sharing as it has been
discussed to date is the best way of doing this.
The paper began by questioning the supposed advantage of profit sharing in
diminishing regulatory instability, given that the time between regulatory
reviews would have to be lengthened in order to preserve incentives for
companies to reduce costs. It was shown that a combination of more sharing and
longer regulatory lag to maintain incentives has mixed effects on regulatory
stability and may, according to certain criteria, actually worsen it. If weaker
incentives are to be tolerated, then shorter regulatory lag may be a preferable
alternative to profit sharing.
The paper then noted the serious measurement problems that arise in using
profits as a basis for price regulation. Profit measures of performance are
particularly subjective and prone to manipulation in utilities because of
difficulties of determining asset values. The fact that asset values are dependent
on charges to customers introduces a circularity between profits and the basis on
                                                                                                                                   
16 The problem of imposing profit sharing on subsidiaries of diversified conglomerates is similar to the taxation
of multinational companies. It is interesting to note that corporate taxation of international organisations is
nearly always based on remittances of earnings to parent firms (dividends) rather than total profits. Similar
measurement difficulties to those discussed above undermine attempts to tax the unremitted component of
earnings.Profit-Sharing Regulation
17
which regulators determine prices. Of course, price-cap regulation does not
escape from these problems, but it has the advantage that they are addressed at
particular occasions when detailed consultation and analysis (and reference to
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission if necessary) are conducted, whereas
the explicit incorporation of `profit’ terms in price controls runs the risk of
continuous costly dispute and regulatory uncertainty.
Problems of circularity and weakened incentives can be diminished in
industries with more than one utility by using comparative performance data.
Profit sharing can then be related to the performance of other firms in the
industry. We suggest that, despite the well-known difficulties of putting explicit
yardstick regulation into practice, yardstick profit sharing would be superior to
own profit sharing.
Problems of subjectivity and manipulation can be further reduced by using
cash- flow or cost rather than profit measures of performance. However, all
performance measures are undermined by the increasing level of diversification
of utilities out of their core businesses and, in particular, by the acquisition of
utilities by other firms. Separate listing requirements for utility subsidiaries
would ameliorate the latter problem.
Where serious problems of performance measurement remain or it is not
possible to use comparative performance information, more attention should be
devoted to the identification of exogenous influences on costs and demand. Price
formulas could be amended to incorporate more cost and demand pass-through
items. The effect would be similar to profit sharing, with profits and prices being
negatively correlated, but incentive and profit measurement problems would be
diminished.
In sum, profit sharing has perhaps been an unduly hasty response to a
problem that could alternatively be treated by modifying rather than abandoning
price-cap regulation. The stability of regulation will only be enhanced if the
current system is amended in a way that establishes an objectively fair basis for
sharing benefits that preserves the incentive properties of price-cap regulation.
For this to be achieved, more attention needs to be devoted to measures of
performance and the identification of exogenous influences on performance. We
have not sought in this paper to give a detailed answer to the question of how
price caps in different industries should be amended to take account of these
factors. However, we suggest that this warrants at least as much attention as has
recently been devoted to the question of the relative merits of price-cap and
profit-sharing regulation.
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